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THOMAS TIGAR.

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Indiana, unter dem Namen:

Deutsche Beobachter VON INDIANA.

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Dr. C. SCHMITZ,
Redacteur.
THOMAS TIGAR,
Drucker.

TIMES OF HOLDING COURTS

IN THE TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT.

Allen county, February 6, August 14.
Adams " March 6, September 4.
Wells " March 13, September 11.
Huntington " March 20, September 18.
Whitley " March 27, September 25.
Noble " April 3, October 2.
Lagrange " April 10, October 9.
Steuben " April 24, October 23.
De Kalb " May 1, October 30.

J. W. BORDEN, President Judge.
W. H. COOKS, Prosecuting Attorney.

FORT WAYNE MAILS.

Logansport, arrives Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday evenings—departs Monday, Wednesday, and Friday mornings.

[During canal navigation this mail will arrive on Wednesday, Friday, and Sunday, and depart on Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday.]

Muskegon City, arrives Saturday and Tuesday; departs Sunday and Wednesday.

Perrin, arrives Monday and Thursday; departs Tuesday and Friday.

Windward, arrives Monday and Thursday; departs Tuesday and Friday.

Elletts, arrives Wednesday and Saturday; departs Wednesday and Sunday.

White Pigeon, arrives Thursday; departs Tuesday.

Branch C. H. arrives Thursday; departs Monday.

Palatka, arrives Saturday; departs Thursday.

Whitely C. H. departs Friday morning, returns on the evening.

S. NOEL, P. M.

MR. VAN BUREN'S REPLY

TO THE
Democratic State Convention of Indiana.

The greater portion, if not the entire mass of evil resulting from the sudden contraction and subsequent expansion of currency and credit, is distinctly chargeable to the desperate and unscrupulous efforts of the Bank of the United States to wrest the renewal of its charter from the people, first by influencing upon them pecuniary distress, and next, the still greater evils of redundant means, which could not be beneficially employed. Had it proceeded to wind up its affairs, with that steady purpose, united with that salutary delay, of which the history of the first Bank furnished an instructive example, its final extinction would have led to no greater distress, or inconvenience, than accompanied and followed the dissolution of that body. But its managers, before and behind the curtain, chose to act otherwise. They combined political and pecuniary elements together, they kept the whole country in a state of feverish agitation which has not yet subsided, they administered additional fuel to the fire of party contention; deranged the entire system of trade and commerce; corrupted political partisans by loans and discounts, for services which they did not dare to specify; defrauded widows and orphans, and stockholders, foreign as well as domestic; bankrupted individuals; destroyed the credit of the State; and after a series of injuries, under which the whole Union is still smarting, finally sunk beneath the weight of their own transgressions, leaving a blot on the history of the country which can never be wiped away.

Though all but omnipotent for evil, it sufficiently demonstrated that it wanted either the will or the power to do good. It neither regulated the currency by restraining the issues of the State Banks, nor the exchanges by accommodating them to the course of trade. On the contrary, in the various stages of its progress and decline, it set the example of unbounded expansion; it set the example in suspension of specie payments; and to the last moment of its existence, was the great enemy of, and obstacle to resumption. The only mode by which it ever sought to regulate exchange, so far as my information extends, was by an arbitrary rule of the Bank, instead of leaving it to the natural laws of trade, which is the best of regulations, because it regulates itself. Such is the case at this moment. There is no United States Bank in existence, and no legislation on the subject yet the rates of exchange between the different portions of the United States, being thus left entirely to the operation of natural and inevitable causes are now far more uniform and equitable, than they were during any period in which the Bank exercised its boasted power of regulation. Whatever diversity exists, heynd the mere cost and risk of transporting specie, arises from a difference in the currency, and cannot therefore be justly ascribed to the want of a regulator of exchanges.

My views on the subject of exchanges, and of the propriety, necessity, or expediency of any interference of government in their regulation, were communicated to Congress in 1837. To repeat them here would lengthen this communication, from which a desire to answer your question fully, frankly, and explicitly, will, I fear, be extended to the verge of tediousness. I must, therefore, respectfully refer you to that document. You will there see a clear, broad distinction between that species of exchanges apply dominated 'king,' which was little better than an instrument of fraud, and bills drawn for the transfer of actual funds from one place to another. I endeavored also to satisfy Congress of what is now so apparent, that the exchanges would here, as they do in other countries, regulate themselves, if Congress would but leave them as they are left elsewhere, to the management of private enterprise. It is doubtless within your recollection what a tempest of denunciation I received from those who thought proper to overlook those considerations. The opinions then advanced would, it is quite certain, be received with more favor now; and I have only to add that they have undergone no other change than that of additional conviction arising from additional experience of their truth.

The tremendous power of a bank for evil, when impelled by avarice and ambition, self-preservation or vengeance has been seen—it is a maxim in every government constitutioned on free principles, to withhold all power from rulers which is not indispensable to the preservation and defence of the rights of person and property. And this maxim is founded on the experience of mankind, which has taught them by a long series of suffering, that not only is power much more liable to abuse than to beneficial exercise, but that with the purest intentions it can do far less good, than it can perpetrate mischief when perverted to evil. The people of the United States have repudiated despotic or discretionary power, in all their political institutions, because of its propensity to abuse. Yet they have been, and mark my words, will be again and again, called upon to create a despotic irresponsible mounted power, stronger than their government, because it is expected to do what that government cannot of itself perform. I hope and trust that such appeals will never again be successful; and that the good people of the United States will always bear in mind, that an institution which can do what its advocates affirm it can, must, if subservient to the government, give it a vast accession of power dangerous to the rights of the States, and which, if for any cause it should become hostile, can either subject that government to its will, or, if the detestable institution of which I have spoken, involve the country in confusion and difficulty, its government in perpetual struggles, and its people in an interminable series of pain and dismay. Nothing but an ever watchful vigilance, on the part of the people, will prevent a recurrence of these evils. The enemy is not dead, nor doth he sleep. The

schism in the ranks of the opponents of the Democracy, turns almost exclusively on the question of a National Bank, and the complete triumph of federalism will be the precursor of such an institution.

In expressing my opposition to all the schemes which have been submitted to Congress at its last session, for managing the financial concerns of the country, involving as they all do, a union of Bank and State, I do not speak the sentiments of a vast majority of my fellow citizens, as evidenced in the votes of their representatives, and in the almost universal condemnation they have apparently received at the hands of the people themselves. The manufacture of paper money has been attempted in every form; it has been tried by individuals, been transferred to corporations by the States, then to corporations by Congress, engaged in by the States themselves, and has signally failed in all. It has in general proved not the handmaid of honest industry and well regulated enterprise, but the impetuous mental of speculation, idleness and fraud. It has corrupted men of the highest standing, almost destroyed the confidence of mankind in each other, and darkened our criminal calendar with names that might otherwise have conferred honor and benefit on the country. There is strong ground for believing that such a system must have some incurable defect, of which no legislation can divest it, and against which no human wisdom can guard, or human integrity sustain itself.

The history of the past, however, leaves little room for doubt that paper money in some form will, notwithstanding, continue to constitute a part of the circulating medium of the country. But my most sincere and ardent wish is, that its issue by the federal government, may in all future time be prevented. The lights of experience have in vain been diffused; the lessons of repeated and wide spread ruin have been unavailing; there be any who yet can bring themselves to believe that the government of the United States, which possesses nothing but what it receives from the people, can bestow on them any thing other than what it has thus received. If it contracts loans, the people must pay them; and if it issues paper money it must be redeemed by the people. How then can relief to the people be derived from assuming obligations which they themselves must redeem?

But in addition to this deception, I might almost say, fraud on the people, there is a decisive objection to the issue of paper currency by governments, upon whatever principle it may be founded. The experience of all nations, where this expedient has been adopted, demonstrates that this is a privilege which will always be abused. It gives almost unlimited facilities for raising money, and has every where led to extravagant expenditures, public debt and heavy burthens, always increasing and never diminished. Where extravagant appropriations can be met by a mere vote of Congress, and without an immediate resort to the pockets of the people, there will be no sufficient check to needless prodigality, except when the government finally loses its credit by pushing it to excess. It is then that it reacts upon the people; for this great resource being exhausted, the whole superstructure of credit falls on their hands and they must bear it as best they can.

The history of the old continental money issued under compulsion, that could alone justify such a measure, is one case in point; the present condition of many of the States is another, and both together furnish ample illustration. In addition to this facility in supplying immediate demands, paper money, being the cheapest of manufactures, can be made at will, on occasion requires. It is not the product of labor, like the precious metals, but of the mere will, and may be increased to any extent that human credulity will tolerate. Hence the right of government to coin money out of silver and gold, is the only prerogative referring to the subject which can be safely exercised, because these metals cannot be increased or diminished, like paper issues, by a mere act of legislation.

To ensure economy in public expenditures it is indispensable that those by whom they are authorized, should have some difficulty and even serious responsibility in obtaining the means of defraying them. In no other way can extravagance be prevented, since it is the nature of man to spend that heedlessly which he acquires without effort, and to think little of that which costs little trouble to gain.

I have dwelt more at length on the part of your enquiry which relates to a National Bank, than I might otherwise have done, from the belief that you look upon it as one of the most vital consequences to the public welfare. In this I entirely coincide with you. Such being the case, it seems due to you as well as to myself, to say that in referring to the public declarations I have heretofore made on this subject, I have been in no degree influenced by any feelings of dissatisfaction at the reputation of these enquiries on the present occasion. So far from this, I most highly applaud the enlightened patriotism of the Democracy of Indiana, in seizing an occasion so appropriate as that of an approaching Presidential election, to require new securities that the principles they themselves cherish, should be carried out to their full extent, and more especially on this all-important question.

I am not one of those who believe that the long cherished project of re-establishing a United States Bank, is, or ever will be, abandoned by that party which always has been, still is, and ever will be the advocate and support of such an institution. It may lie dormant for a season, from a conviction of its being inexpedient to revive it; but he must be blind to all indications of the future who, seeing that even at the very period when the old bank was infesting the very air we breathed with its corruptions, and when public indignation was most heavily weighed on its long series of delinquencies—at that very moment, a successful effort was made in both houses of Congress to create a similar institution, should nevertheless, pull his caution to sleep with the delusive idea that the project will ever be abandoned. Most assuredly nothing but the stern vigilance of the Democracy will guard it against an institution, which may thus be prostituted to the ruin of individuals, the disgrace of the

country, and which, while so limited in its power to do good, is so potent for the perpetration of evil.

The tenacity with which our opponents adhere to the Distribution of the Proceeds of the Public Lands among the States, is a political anomaly, which it is not a little difficult to explain, or to reconcile, with a fair understanding of or a proper regard for the true interests of the country.—I am an apology for it can be made, it is to be traced to that unwillfulness to abandon, in the face of their opponents, a position which has been assumed with confidence and supported with earnestness—an indisposition from which but few political associations are altogether exempt. Whatever may have been expected from this measure by its authors, or however plausibly deceptive its theory may have been, at a period when the country was threatened with the evils incident to an overfilling treasury, subsequent experience in regard to the working of our political and financial systems, ought long since to have satisfied every reflecting mind as well as its utter inutility as a means of relief to the States, as of its destructive tendency to the stability and welfare of the Union. As the matter now stands, and has for years stood, it presents in the former aspect, the simple question, whether the people of the country can possibly be benefited, by receiving into the State Treasury a certain sum of money annually, to be immediately re-collected from themselves in the shape of taxes upon what they eat, drink and wear, with the addition of the expense of collection. Every attempt to give the measure any other tenable aspect, has proved utterly unavailing. It is certainly paying but a poor compensation, to the capacity of the people, to suppose, for a moment, that they could be brought, by any pretext, however plausible, to stultify themselves so far as to adopt a proposition so preposterous. Can any intelligent mind hesitate in giving to it a prompt negative? And can any patriotic one fail to regret that the character of our people for intelligence and sagacity, in the estimation of mankind, should be exposed to hazard by the grave and continued agitation of such a question before them?

It can, after this, and after what I have heretofore said upon the subject, be scarcely necessary to repeat, that I am opposed to the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands among the States. The best evidence I can give you of my present opinion in regard to the proper disposition of the public lands, is to refer you to those which were avowed and acted upon by me while in office, and which were very fully stated in my first annual message to Congress, in Dec., 1837.

My views in relation to the Protective system, were also called for by the Shreve Springs meeting in 1832, and freely given. A conviction that the establishment of commercial regulations with a view to the encouragement of domestic interests, is within the constitutional power of Congress, was on that occasion distinctly avowed. But holding this opinion, I at the same time denied the propriety of exercising this power in a manner calculated to oppress any portion of my fellow citizens, or to advance the interest of one section of the Union at the expense of another. I on the contrary, affirmed it to be the duty of those who are entrusted with the administration of the Federal Government, to direct its operations in the manner best calculated to distribute as equally as possible its burthens and blessings among the several States and the people thereof. In addition to the declaration of these general views, I suggested more specific rules for the action of the government in this particular, by the observance of which I believed those views would be most likely to be carried into effect.

More than ten years elapsed since that communication was made; and during that entire period, the people of the United States have paid large amounts of duties avowedly imposed for the encouragement and protection of domestic manufactures, with gradual reductions according to the provisions of the compromise act of 1833. The unbiased sentiment of the country, in respect to what is under such circumstances the proper rule for legislative action upon this subject, has, I think, by the course of events and the progress of opinion, been brought to the conclusion, briefly expressed in one of the resolutions of your convention, viz: a discriminating tariff for revenue purposes only, and which will incidentally protect American industry.

But as experience has shown that the terms employed by your convention are not always employed in the same sense, it is due as well to the subject and the occasion as to myself, that I should give you without reserve, my own understanding of them.

Adquate revenue, for the support of all governments, must be derived from some source. It has nowhere been found an easy task to preserve equality in raising it, and the same time to overcome the general repugnance to the payment of taxes in any shape, a repugnance arising more from an apprehension that their avails will not be wisely applied, than from an unwillingness on the part of the people to sustain their government by the necessary contributions. All must agree that taxes should be imposed with a fair and full reference to the advantages derived from the existence of good government, by those who pay them. Those advantages may in general terms be justly described as resulting from ample security in the enjoyment of our personal rights and rights of property, with adequate safeguards against internal commotion and foreign aggression in respect to the immunities of the person, and civil and religious freedom, the interest as well as the immediate advantages, of all are equal. Not so with the other privileges secured to us by our free government. The unavoidable disparity in the pecuniary condition of our citizens, makes the degree of benefit they respectively derive from the maintenance of an efficient government over property and the rights of property essentially different. The modes of raising revenue allowed to and adopted by the State governments, are generally graduated by this disparity. If the results are not always equitable, the fault, it is believed, will in most cases be found in their action upon the principle, rather than in the principle itself. The right to raise revenue for its support, by the imposition of

duties in lieu of direct taxation, is, by the constitution, subjected to the exclusive control of the federal Government. This right, subject to the limitations imposed by the grant, was given for that purpose, and has been freely exercised by it since its establishment. It would afford me much pleasure to be able to say that the exercise of this power has borne as equally upon all classes of the people, however unequal in their pecuniary condition, as the taxes imposed by the State governments. But this cannot with truth be said. Nor is the inequality unavoidably resulting from the federal mode of collecting taxes, a new discovery. It was foreseen and objected to when the power was conferred, as an evil inherent to the system, which could not fail to show itself in its operation, and the justice of which no form of legislation, however it might be made to mitigate, could ever be able to remove. The advocates of the system were notwithstanding reconciled to it by a belief, no doubt sincerely entertained, that the inequalities which it was feared would result from the collection of duties upon imported articles, would be prevented by the fact that the consumption would be in proportion to the means of the consumer. It was upon this ground that the principle was defended. That this expectation has not been realized, is undeniably true. There are but few if any who cannot, in their immediate vicinity, point out numerous instances in which poor men with large families, are actually obliged to pay more for the support of the Federal Government, than others who are in affluent circumstances, but are either without, or have smaller families; and few if any can, without examples are to be found. At the same time, the great body of wealth invested in incorporated or associated companies, and in bonds and notes, entire escape Federal taxation. The mass of the people seem nevertheless to prefer this mode of collecting revenue. Paying their taxes in the form of an increased price upon the commodities they buy, their contribution, losses, in their estimation, much of the odium that would be attached to it if severed from the price of the article, and converted into a tax by name as it is in fact. It also wears the appearance of a voluntary contribution, although its payment is for the most part as unavoidable as a compulsory imposition would be. It is supported too by the odium which was attached to the imposition of direct taxes many years since, for purposes which were not approved by the people, and by the fact that in most of the States the taxes are directly levied on the property of the citizen, and not on the revenue of the Federal Government. These and other considerations have given to the impost a preference on the public mind which would render the imposition of direct taxes in time of peace exceedingly odious, and have produced as great a degree of unanimity in favor of a tariff for revenue as ever can be expected upon a public question. Of the great mass of opponents to a protective tariff, there is not, so far as I know, a single State or even district that has taken ground against a revenue tariff.

Let us now for a moment look at the advantages which the manufacturing interest, above any other, derives from a tariff imposed for revenue only. The first tariff bill, passed in 1789, and all those that followed it between that period and the war, were in fact, notwithstanding the recitals in some of them, revenue bills. The average amount of the impost under them, commencing at 12 1/2 per cent, was gradually increased from that to 15 and to 20 per cent. At the latter average it stood from 1800 to 1808, and until the commencement of preparations for war. Twenty per centum, upon an average, appears, in the judgment of those best acquainted with the subject here and elsewhere, to be the rate best adapted for revenue. It is the amount also to which it was the design of the Compromise Act to reduce the tariff, and one which ought certainly not to be exceeded, except when absolutely necessary for revenue, and likely, from the state of the country, to effect this object. The rate to which all parties appear willing to go under the existing condition of the treasury, and to continue it until that condition is sufficiently improved to justify a reduction, is, I believe, an average of 25 per cent. To this duty is to be added the charges upon imported articles arising from the costs of transportation from Europe, consisting of freight, insurance, the expenses of agencies, or profits to successive holders, and cash duties, which are estimated by those who understand the matter better than I do, at not less than 10 per cent making, if the average rate of duties is 25 per cent, an amount of charges upon imported articles, before they are placed in our market upon a par with similar articles manufactured here, equal to 35 per cent, and if the average duty is 20 per cent, to 30 per cent. If the foreign article is not without advantage brought in, and a competition entered into with the home manufacturers, these duties and charges operate, whilst the competition lasts, as a protection to the domestic manufacturer, equal to their sum—giving him by so much the advantage, to the sale of his commodities, over the importer; and if the effect of these charges is to prevent the importation of such articles altogether, they then give him an entire monopoly of the home market. These are the direct advantages which result to the manufacturing interest from the raising of revenue by the imposition of duties upon imports, instead of direct taxation.

Let us next consider whether the other great interests of the country derive any, and if any, what direct advantages from this mode of collecting the public revenue. I do not profess to be as well acquainted with the progress and probable results of our fiscal operations, upon trade and labor, as those who, by their pursuits in life, have enjoyed greater advantages for acquiring this kind of information. I give you, in answer to your inquiries, the best views that I am able to take of the subject. If I fall into any errors, they will certainly be unintentional, and as certainly be corrected by those who are better informed. And first as relates to the agricultural, that greatest of all interests, it is certainly true, that in the formation of our tariff, duties varying in amount are also imposed on the same articles which constitute the staple productions of this country, when imported from abroad; but is it not equally true that the effect of that imposition, in relation to the protection thereby afforded to the

domestic production of them, is, for the most part, nominal? When we look at the comparatively small amount of duties received at the treasury upon the importation of the important articles, beef, pork, flour, various kinds of grain, cotton, rice, sugar, wool, &c., contrasted with that collected upon the importation of manufactured articles, we cannot but be sensible that this is so. The farmer and planter, it is true enjoy, and to a great degree without competition with foreign producers, our own market for the sale of most of the fruits of their labor; but it is a security derived chiefly, if not altogether, from natural causes, for which nobody pays, and which derives but little aid from legislation. It is, on the contrary, to the nature of our climate, the enterprise and industry of our citizens, the character of our soil, and extent of our territory, with other facilities for the easier and cheaper growth of agricultural products here, that the agriculturist is chiefly indebted for his protection against foreign competition. To foster the interests of commerce and navigation, has been the object of the Federal Government; and much has certainly been done to accomplish it, through the instrumentality of salutary laws and treaty stipulations. Respect has also been very generally had to these interests, and more particularly that of navigation, even in our revenue bills, by low duties or exemption from duties upon articles necessary and useful to them; but it will not, I believe, be contended in any quarter, that the prosperity of either of these great interests is essentially advanced by a protective or a revenue tariff. That the great body of the mechanics and laborers in every branch of business, whose welfare should be an object of unceasing solicitude on the part of every public man, have been the greatest sufferers by our high protective tariffs, and would continue so to be, if that policy is persisted in, is to my mind too clear to require further elucidation.

If these views are correct, and in all essential particulars, I cannot doubt their being so, it is apparent that the manufacturing interest derives an advantage from the collection of the revenue of the Federal Government through the custom houses, instead of their being obtained by the mode of taxation adopted by the States, incomparably greater than any other of the important interests of the country—indeed, than all of them put together. That this advantage consists in a preference in the American market over their foreign competitors, of not less than 30 per cent, when the revenue standard is reduced to an average of 20 per cent, and liable to be increased as before stated; that it is enjoyed by virtue of a tariff, the collection of the duties imposed by which, whilst it subjects all to taxation, invariably and almost inevitably bears with unequal severity upon a very large, and unhappy in general, a successive portion of the people—a protection, the indirect advantages of which to other interests, even under a tariff for protection, are as much the subject of doubt and disposition as they ever were, but for which those concerned in other pursuits have for a long series of years paid in advance, and received their equivalent in promises, of the performance of which they are not and do not seem likely to be anon satisfied. This advantage to the manufacturer is not, it is true, the object of, but only incidental to, a tariff for revenue. Still it is not, on that account the less beneficial to him.

The position assumed by your convention and in which I fully concur, is, that the incidental protection thus derived, is all the legislative favor which can at this day be conferred upon the manufacturer without great injustice to other interests. The expediency of the adoption by Congress, at any time, of temporary measures of retaliation, when likely to be effective in counteracting foreign legislation injurious to American interests, is a question involving different considerations. We have it from quarters entitled to respect that the most considerate of the domestic manufacturers are satisfied with this measure of protection—that tired of having their peculiar interests embarked in political contests resulting at one time in an excess of duties which tempt to an undue and ruinous increase of capital in their business, and at another, under the deep and excited feelings which perpetual controversy engenders, in sudden and great reductions equally injurious—that, conscious of the extent to which, for more than a quarter of a century, they have engrossed the time and attention of the national legislature and of the people, and of the millions upon millions which have during that time been collected from the latter, avowedly to be a tribute and give special advantages to the particular pursuit in which they are engaged, not only to the exclusion of, but at the immediate cost of those of others—and sensible, as the most observing amongst them must be, that the period has passed away when a tariff designed for protection can be kept up in this country, without doing more injury to every interest, by the convulsions and revolutions which it cannot fail to produce in public opinion, than it can confer benefit on theirs—they would themselves prefer that the protection secured to them by the legislation of Congress, should be confined to that which is incidentally derived from a revenue tariff. So far as certainty in their condition, a matter of inestimable importance, is concerned, it is the only course by which even an approach to its accomplishment can be hoped for.

To all present appearances, the acquiescence in a tariff for revenue, now a general may, in the absence of special excitement, endure for a period as long as is commonly embraced in calculations of business. It cannot however, have escaped the attention of the manufacturers, that although no State or district of country may yet have taken ground against this mode of raising revenue for the support of the Government, there are in every section of our extended country, who, penetrated by a deep sense of the inequality and consequent injustice of its operation, are applying all the energies of their minds to the overthrow of the system itself. They cannot be ignorant, either, of the fact that a prejudice against direct taxation, springing in some degree at least from a supposed abuse of the power in times past, may yield to time and reflection, or may be supplanted by a new and stronger antipathy. What could be more likely to awaken popular aversion

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than the sight of great and affluent interest in the country, standing out amid the general gloom, pertinaciously exerting its influence in the councils of the nation, not only to save itself from the misfortune which had overtaken all other classes, but to secure its own aggrandizement by new and unjust impositions on a community already borne to the earth by the adverse course of events. Individual and their families may be (and in other countries are) permanently billeted on the public coffers; but all experience has shown that, with us at least, it is not in the power of the government to secure permanent advantages to the business pursuits of one class over those of all others. The very patronage which is thus unduly received, has a tendency to relax the exertions, and to dissipate the prudence of its recipients; and if the spirit of monopoly is not in this way defeated, it is sure to be brought down in the end by the controlling power of an excited and enlightened public sentiment. I do, therefore, sincerely hope that the disposition which is attributed to a portion at least of the manufacturing interest, does in fact exist, and that it will soon become general. But whether it be so or not, the principle advanced by your convention is without doubt the true one for our future government.

When the convention speak of a discriminating tariff for revenue, I understand them as referring to discriminations below the maximum rate of duties upon imported articles, not designed to increase the protection already afforded to domestic manufactures, but to carry out views of policy different in their character, and which may properly be embraced in such a measure.

Of the constitutional power to make discriminations, I have no doubt. Equally clear it is that the practice of making them has existed from the commencement of the government, and constitutes a feature in every principal tariff bill which is to be found upon our statute book. They are indeed indispensable to the successful operation of every revenue bill, whether the design be to guard against smuggling on the one hand, where the nature of the article is such as to afford facilities for that practice, or on the other to prevent loss to the treasury by the imposition of duties higher than the value of the article will bear, and thus prohibiting its introduction into the country. If it be at any time deemed necessary, or conducive to the safety of the country, to encourage the manufacture at home of the articles necessary to its defence in war, nothing can be more proper than to do so by a discrimination in favor of their domestic manufacture, inasmuch as the object in view is to promote the safety of all at the expense of all. Discriminations have constantly been made in favor of articles imported for the use of philosophical or literary societies, for the encouragement of the fine arts, or for the use of seminaries of learning, specimens in natural history, animals imported to breed, &c., &c., all founded on the same principle, in respect to the universality of benefits designed to be secured at the common expense. But above all, is the power to make them of inestimable importance, as the only means of relieving the poorer classes from the unequal operation of this mode of collecting the public revenues, and of partially realizing Mr. Jefferson's beautiful idea of a wise and frugal government; one which "shall restrain men from injuring one another, and shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned." The man of wealth, when he pays a tax, in the form of impost, which enures incidentally to the advancement of a special interest in which he is not concerned, is in a degree reconciled by the reflection, that if the amount paid was not collected in this form, it would be assessed upon him in another—by which the amount of this contribution, in comparison with those of his less affluent neighbors, would be materially enhanced. But to the poor man, no such consolation is afforded. The system which operates thus favorably to his more fortunate neighbor, increases his taxes in an inverse ratio to his ability to pay. Every additional mouth that he has to feed, adds to the contribution he is obliged to make for the support of government. It is only by discrimination in favor of articles necessary to his comfort, that the injustice to which he is exposed can be mitigated. It is therefore a power, the constant and faithful exercise of which is, in my judgment, demanded by considerations of justice, humanity, and sound policy.

I am satisfied with the Veto Power as it exists by the constitution, and opposed to any modification which shall materially change the principle upon which it rests.

To frame an organic law for the establishment of one general government for thirteen independent sovereignties already in existence, and accustomed to the use of power, with satisfactory provisions for the admission of new States, to be thereafter carved out of the national domain, was a work of a great difficulty. To obstacles, unavoidably attendant upon such an undertaking under circumstances the most favorable, were, in our case, to be added embarrassments of the gravest character. These consisted, among others, of diversities of climate, and consequently of staple productions—in the facilities for the prosecution of foreign commerce, and other business pursuits, which belong to different portions of the country; and, to an inconceivable extent also, to differences in their origin, and in the political preferences of the inhabitants of the respective States—pre-

ferences rendered inveterate by the severity of a bloody and protracted civil war. The success with which the great work was notwithstanding accomplished by its immortal authors, has surpassed even their own most sanguine expectations, and elicited the admiration and applause of the friends of freedom throughout the world. It has given stability to republican principles, multiplied and strengthened the proofs of the capacity of man for self-government, and disappointed the hopes of the enemies of free institutions. No instance of a written constitution is to be found which has undergone so little change since it came from the hands of its framers, or which possesses in so eminent a degree the confidence, the respect, and I may add, the reverence of those who are subject to its operation. It is from the general prevalence of such feelings on the part of our citizens, that the constitution derives much, not to say most of its efficiency; and it is by doing all in our power to increase and strengthen them that we can alone hope to make its existence perpetual. Although successful beyond example, no one pretends that it is perfect. Perfection is an attribute which does not belong to the works of man. Defects must therefore be corrected as they show themselves in the practical working of the system. It is to such and it might perhaps be safely added, to such only, that the hand of reform can be safely applied. That the provision of the constitution under consideration, can be so successfully rendered obnoxious to prejudice, is undoubtedly true. There is never a day passing in its structure incongruous with the general scope of our peculiar system of government, or anything which is calculated to lead to bad results. There is nevertheless nothing in its structure inconsistent with the general scope of our peculiar system of government, or anything which is calculated to lead to bad results. Although absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority, is, in the language of Mr. Jefferson a cardinal principle in Republican Government, it is yet to be remembered, that it is to the will of the majority, expressed according to the forms of the constitution, that he refers, and that there is no channel provided by our constitution through which the sense of the people of the United States, in the aggregate, may be taken. Such a provision was deemed incompatible with a full enjoyment by the States of the rights of sovereignty which they reserved to themselves, and with which it was neither the intention of the framers of that instrument, nor of the people who adopted it, to interfere. The qualifications of the power of the majority, and the restrictions upon the authority of the Federal Government, which pervade the constitution, are doubtless to be traced to this source.

The right of the President to suspend the operation of an act of Congress, by withholding his assent from it, and in the absence of the requisite majority to defeat it for the time being, is therefore in harmony with the spirit and design of the entire system. I say for the time being, because all experience has shown that objections to a public measure on the part of any branch of the government, are, in the end, always made to yield to the settled and well ascertained wishes of the people in whatever mode they may be elicited; the effect of the interference of the Executive, being to secure a fuller and more perfect reconsideration of the whole subject by the people. Nor was this power bestowed upon the Executive without adequate consideration, and a full view of the beneficial effects it was capable of producing in the administration of a government to which such various, momentous, and not unfrequently contrary, interests were to be entrusted. The President is the only efficient officer, and with the single exception of the Vice President, the only one in the Federal Government, in the election of whom all the States, and the electors of each State, take part. All others are comparatively local, as well in respect to the constituencies by whom they are chosen, as to their immediate responsibilities. The President is the only efficient representative in the Federal system, between whom and the whole confederacy there exists that common sympathy which arises from the relation of elector and representative, and the obligation it imposes. It is to him, therefore, more than to any other functionary of the Federal Government, that the people of all the States look, and have a right to look, for an impartial attention to the interests of every section of our greatly extended Union. To enable him to perform his important duties, a portion of the powers necessary to good government, is by the constitution vested in the Executive Department. The veto constitutes an important, and in my opinion, a very useful part of those powers. It is a part, also, which can seldom, if ever, be employed by the incumbent of the Presidential chair to promote personal objects. This consideration cannot be too highly appreciated. It is the liability of public trusts to be thus abused, that has been the canker of every public service. The occasion would be a rare one indeed, upon which the President could, by the exercise of the veto power, minister to his private gratification, or to that of his friends, or even to the

advancement of his political interests, except by means the most honorable, and through a channel in an eminent degree free from exception. By refusing his assent to a bill which has passed both houses, he is sure to excite at the outset the formidable opposition of those influential bodies, to offend the particular interests which expect to be advanced by the measure, and to expose himself to the temporary odium of running counter to what is properly regarded as presumptive evidence of the will of the people. No public man will be apt to place himself in a position so trying, unless he is influenced by an irresistible conviction of right, and a firm confidence in the ultimate rectitude of that public opinion by which he can alone hope to be sustained. Our political system does not, therefore, clothe any of the agents it employs with authority which is more likely to be exerted from pure motives, and to patriotic ends.

We have, in these considerations, the best of human securities, that this negative power will be but seldom exercised, and never when there is not good reason to believe that the legislature has, for the moment, through inadvertence, error of opinion, or other causes, placed itself in opposition to the interest and wishes of the people. This inference is fully sustained by experience. The administration of Mr. Adams, of Mr. Jefferson, and of that over which I had the honor to preside, did not, I believe, propose a single veto. The whole number since the establishment of the government is very small; and those who make war upon the principle, may be safely challenged to produce a single instance in which the Presidential veto failed to be sustained by the people.

The most important, by far, of the occasions upon which it has been interposed, were in regard to a National Bank, and to Internal Improvements by the General Government. To repeat my own convictions of the dangerous character of such an institution, or the public evils which experience has shown to be inseparable from its existence, would be superfluous.

Resistance, through the instrumentality of the system devised for making internal improvements in the states, under the authority and at the expense of the federal government, was commenced by Mr. Madison on the occasion of his veto to the bonus bill—continued by Mr. Monroe, on that of his veto to the bill for the collection of tolls on the Cumberland Road,—and the whole scheme, with the exception of limited appropriations for the improvement of certain harbors, and the removal of temporary obstructions in certain rivers, was finally overthrown under that of Gen. Jackson, by his celebrated Maysville veto, and other acts of a kindred character. It would, with the mass of facts we have before us, all tending to the same conclusion, be but a poor compliment to the intelligence of the people to enlarge upon the benefits which the country has derived from the overthrow of this mischievous and dangerous policy. From the greater tendency of legislation by Congress, upon such subjects, to what is called log rolling, than that of the states, it is quite certain that the two hundred millions of debt incurred by the latter for these and similar purposes, would have been vastly enhanced, if such objects had been undertaken by the federal government.

Indeed there can be but little if any doubt in the mind of any calm and intelligent observer, that but for the Maysville veto, and the subsequent adherence to its principles and policy, the general government would at this moment have been saddled with a debt of some three or four hundred millions, without having even as much to show for it as have the embarrassed states. When our present condition in these respects is contrasted with what it would have been under the grinding oppression of such a debt, and the corrupting and destructive operation of a national bank, we may form some idea of the advantages which the country has derived from the exercise of the presidential veto. The best effects have also followed its exercise in respect to its influence upon public opinion. Although that policy has now but few if any advocates, no one can have forgotten how deeply the public mind, in many parts of the country, was elicited in its favor.

The necessary limits to a communication of this character, render it impossible to do justice to the various other aspects in which this power may be usefully employed in the administration of the government. As a shield which may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, be thrown over a weaker department of the government, or over the interests of a less powerful section of the Union, when they are, in the opinion of the Executive unjustly invaded, it may become of the greatest importance. Political power, as it respects different portions of the republic, is constantly changing hands, and no particular party can count with safety upon its perpetual exemption from the effects of such alternations. When the federal constitution was adopted, Massachusetts and Virginia were decidedly the most powerful states in the confederacy. New York was classed among, and partook of the feelings, which were common to, the small states, and the territory which now constitutes the western states, was for the most part the abode of savages. Although still strong in the virtue, spirit, enterprise, intelligence and patriotism of their citizens, and respectable in all things, it is well known that those venerable states have already, in numerical strength, fallen behind some of their contemporaries, and the great west, if not already, is destined soon to become the seat of federal power. No portion of the Union can therefore assume, with certainty, that it may not, in the course of time and

circumstances, become useful, if not necessary, to invoke the exercise of this salutary power for the protection of its rights and interests.

The control of the President over the dispensation of the federal patronage, presents a subject far more deserving of the watchful vigilance of the people. Charged by the constitution with the execution of the laws, it was altogether proper to confer upon him upon the most important of his selections, and in each branch of the legislature by an equally absolute negative upon the appropriations necessary to their compensation. It is nevertheless true, that this control over the distribution of public patronage is, in its tendency, adverse to a pure administration of the important trusts which the people have committed to their agents. Experience has shown that there is a temptation in the possession of this power, to its abuse, which cannot be effectually guarded against by human laws, and against the influence of which even honest and patriotic men not unfrequently find it difficult to guard themselves. With all the restraints imposed upon its exercise, it may still be wielded by the Executive to influence widely the action of his associates in the public service, to secure and perpetuate his own authority, for the aggrandizement of his personal adherents, and to depress those who they may possess the strongest claim upon the public confidence, have not the good fortune to stand in that relation to the appointing power. It would be honorable to human nature, if we could flatter ourselves with the belief that such have not been, or the hope that such will not in future be, the result of its exercise. But experience unfortunately teaches us a different lesson, and from the fallible nature of man, we are scarcely allowed to hope that it will ever be otherwise. To encourage an honest observance of sound political principles by the dispensation of patronage, is, I fear, an advantage seldom, if ever realized, under any government. Its tendencies, there is too much reason to apprehend, have been in general far otherwise. For this evil, and a grave one it is, there is but one effectual remedy. When we cannot dispense with the officers, we must distribute as widely as possible the power of appointing them. To make this remedy more effectual, it is always wise to reserve the selections of public officers, as far as practicable and convenient, to the people themselves. It is not an easy matter to keep individual action in public affairs, wholly free from the influence, in some form, of personal interest. That of the mass of the people is, on the contrary, almost invariably disinterested, and seldom, if ever, fails to come right in the end. As much much power over appointment as is deemed really necessary to enable the Executive to perform his responsible duties, should be left to him. Of all beyond that, and which can be as well exercised by the people themselves, or otherwise, he should, by constitutional means, be divested. The possession of the excess is decidedly adverse to the healthy action of the department. No right minded man, occupying the Presidential chair, after he has had an opportunity to judge by experience of its effects, will desire to possess it. From this prolific source proceeds most of the temptations which draw the ambitious politician from his duty to his constituents. While the veto is generally applied to questions exclusively of public concern, and is exercised under personal responsibility which will not be incurred, except with great reluctance, and in cases in which there is strong reliance upon the public judgment for support, this power is peculiarly adapted to the sinister purposes of ambitious and selfish aspirants. It is therefore by diminishing this executive power, and not that of the veto, which is least liable to abuse, and has been thus far uniformly exercised for the public advantage, that our statesmen can render the most essential, and, I doubt not, the most acceptable service to the cause of the people. To accomplish this great and salutary object presents a proper field for the patriotic exertions of all who think it wise, as I do, to keep a jealous eye upon Executive authority, and particularly upon its administration of the public patronage. Placed at the head of the committee upon appointments in the convention for the amendment of the constitution of my own state, I took an active, and I hope not an intellectual part, to carry out this principle, as far as with the lights which experience had then afforded, I thought we could safely go. As these lights multiplied, I united in giving it a still wider vention they propose to hold, an honest and full expression of the wishes and opinions of a majority of their political associates. Bearing in mind the disreputable scenes of 1840; conscious of the effects which those scenes necessarily had in shaking the confidence of mankind in the fitness of the American people for free institutions; and actuated by a patriotic zeal to wipe off, now and for ever, every injurious impression which was thus made upon the character of either, they will not, I am certain, permit their noble efforts in so good a cause, to be stained by a single act of indiscretion or unfairness. So believing, I hold it to be impossible that a selection can proceed from such a source which I could not cheerfully support—or a nominee be selected in whose hands the interests of the country would not be entirely safe.

My name and pretensions, however sub-

ordinate in importance, shall never be at the disposal of the public attention, for the purpose of creating distraction or division in the democratic party. Every attempt to use them for such a purpose, whenever and wherever made, shall be arrested by an interference on my part, alike prompt and decisive. I regard the presidency as the highest and most honorable of political distinctions—yet it is only as the undoubted and free will offering of the Democracy of the Nation that I could accept it, because it is in that respect only that I could hope to render the discharge of its high duties either useful to the country, or honorable to myself.

I am, gentlemen,
With sentiments of high regard,
Your obedient servant,
M. VAN BUREN.

Hon. Ethan A. Brown, John Lane, Nathaniel West, John Pettit, Jesse D. Bright, and A. C. Pepper, Esqrs., Committee.

FORT WAYNE SENTINEL.

SATURDAY, MAY 13, 1843.

FOR PRESIDENT
MARTIN VAN BUREN.

FOR VICE PRESIDENT
RICHARD M. JOHNSON.

(Subject to the decision of a National Convention.)
FOR GOVERNOR
JAMES WHITCOMB.

FOR LIEUT. GOVERNOR
JESSE D. BRIGHT.

FOR CONGRESS, TENTH DISTRICT.
ANDREW KENNEDY.

Canal Celebration.

It having been deemed expedient to have a public celebration of the opening of the Wabash and Erie Canal from Lake Erie to Lafayette,

On the FOURTH of JULY next,

at some convenient point to be participated in by the citizens on the whole line, a PUBLIC MEETING of the citizens of Fort Wayne will be held at the American House, on Wednesday evening next, at early candle light, to take the matter into consideration, and to appoint corresponding and other committees. A general attendance is requested.

We have been compelled to devote so much time this week to an attempt to collect a portion of what is due us, that we have been able to bestow but little attention on the paper; and our success was so poor that we do not feel much in the humor for writing; moreover our columns are so nearly filled by Mr. Van Buren's able letter and the list of the lost Treasury notes, that we have no room for comments. These we hope will be considered sufficient reasons for the scarcity of editorial this week.

Let all our readers, who as well as democrats, persevere Mr. Van Buren's admirable letter. There is no non-committal about it—nothing kept from the public eye.

Where's Judge Kilgore?—We hear it reported that Kilgore declines the Whig nomination for Congress. We hope this is not so.

Wabash & Erie.—Twenty two canal boats arrived here from the lake this week. Ten have arrived from Lafayette, and proceeded to the lake.

AUGUST ELECTION.

We are authorized to announce LUCIEN P. FERRY as a candidate to represent Allen county in the next Legislature.

We are desired by "Many Citizens" to announce DAN L. REID as candidate for Assessor of Allen County.

RUBEN J. DAWSON, Esq. of De Kalb County, is a candidate for Prosecuting Attorney in the 12th Judicial Circuit.

LYSANDER WILLIAMS, Esq. of Fort Wayne, is a candidate for Prosecuting Attorney in the 12th Judicial Circuit.

HORATIO M. SLACK, Esq. of Noble county, is a candidate for Prosecuting Attorney in the 12th Judicial Circuit.

We are authorized to announce the name of FRANCIS D. LASSELLE as a candidate at the coming August election, for county Commissioner in the 3d district.

We are requested to announce MADISON SWEETSER as candidate to represent Allen county in the next Legislature.

LIST OF BANKABLE FUNDS.

A list of banks, the notes of which are receivable at the Fort Wayne Branch of the State Bank of Indiana. They are counterfeited or altered notes on all bank notes marked thus *

No.	Letter.	Date of Note.	Amount of Note.	Rate of Int. p. a.
3354	C	10 November, 1837	\$100	6
6929	B	23 June, 1838	100	6
6843	A	25 August, "	50	6
388	A	1 May, 1840	50	2
452	C	6 "	100	5 2-5
260	B	13 "	100	2
413	C	11 "	100	6
252	C	5 March "	100	6
734	B	29 July, "	100	5
327	C	24 October, "	500	2
-	B	17 December, "	50	2
2921	B	"	50	2
56	B	2 January, 1841	100	6
2942	B	30 "	50	6
-	C	12 February, "	100	2
200	B	16 "	100	2
158	B	"	50	2
154	A	"	50	2
163	A	23 "	500	6
218	B	"	50	6
171	C	3 March, "	1000	6
134	B	6 "	1000	6
125	C	"	1000	6
240	C	"	500	6
249	C	"	500	6
19	A	9 "	100	6
77	B	11 "	500	6
73	C	"	400	6
76	A	"	400	6
81	C	"	500	6
64	A	12 "	1000	4
557	B	31 "	500	2
700	A	"	50	6
527	B	5 April, "	1000	6
620	C	"	1000	6
537	C	"	1000	6
653	A	"	1000	6
772	A	23 "	1000	6
200	B	30 "	500	2
802	B	2 May, "	500	6
487	A	3 "	500	6
808	A	"	50	6
404	B	"	1000	6
405	A	"	1000	6
395	B	6 "	1000	6
396	C	"	1000	6
408	C	"	1000	6
679	C	3 "	1000	6
394	A	6 "	1000	6
673	A	13 "	500	6
674	B	"	500	6
579	C	26 "	50	2
30	C	31 "	1000	2
33	C	"	1000	2
1160	B	7 June, "	1000	4
351	A	15 "	50	2
246	B	"	500	2-5
112	A	28 "	100	2-5
558	C	7 July, "	500	2
610	A	12 "	100	5 2-5
220	A	"	500	5 2-5
221	B	"	500	5 2-5
642	C	"	100	5 2-5
643	C	"	50	5 2-5
129	C	"	50	5 2-5
83	B	"	50	5 2-5
691	A	"	50	5 2-5
207	A	"	50	5 2-5
520	A	"	50	5 2-5
365	A	"	100	5 2-5
589	C	"	100	5 2-5
423	C	"	100	5 2-5
721	A	"	50	5 2-5
567	C	"	100	5 2-5
410	B	"	50	5 2-5
441	C	"	50	5 2-5
377	B	"	100	5 2-5
357	C	"	100	5 2-5
352	C	"	50	5 2-5
337	A	"	100	5 2-5
369	B	"	100	5 2-5
563	B	"	100	5 2-5
421	A	"	50	5 2-5
293	B	"	50	5 2-5
484	C	"	100	5 2-5
535	A	"	100	5 2-5
599	B	"	50	5 2-5
594	C	"	50	5 2-5
713	B	"	50	5 2-5
780	C	"	50	5 2-5
576	C	"	50	5 2-5
690	C	"	50	5 2-5
614	B	"	100	5 2-5
205	A	30 September, "	500	2
206	B	"	500	2
717	C	7 October, "	500	2
1122	C	"	50	2
1045	A	"	100	2
1309	C	"	50	2
1313	B	5 November, "	100	2
1340	B	"	100	2
1346	B	"	100	2
1429	A	13 "	50	2
765	C	19 "	500	2
1552	A	24 "	50	2
1688	A	25 "	100	2
1667	B	1 December, "	100	2
1668	C	"	100	2
1669	A	"	100	2
1670	B	"	100	2
1671	C	"	100	2
1672	A	"	100	2
840	C	"	500	2
1854	C	23 "	100	2
1867	A	"	100	2
1790	A	"	50	2
1954	A	"	100	2
1012	A	"	50	2
1938	C	"	100	2
1892	A	"	50	2
1008	A	"	50	2
543	C	"	500	6
542	B	"	500	6
541	A	"	500	6
538	A	"	500	6
539	B	"	500	6
540	C	"	500	6
1616	B	31 "	100	6
2208	C	"	100	2
2209	C	"	50	2
2245	A	"	50	2
2253	C	"	100	2
2328	A	"	100	2
2348	B	"	50	2
2347	C	"	50	2
2348	A	"	50	2
2170	A	"	50	2
2278	A	"	100	2
2279	B	"	100	2
865	A	5 February, 1843	500	6
2040	C	"	50	6
3080	C	"	50	6
3469	A	"	50	6
87	B	"	500	6
882	C	"	500	6
3739	A	"	100	6
3740	B	"	100	6
3492	C	"	100	6
3498	A	"	100	6

APR 22, 1948.

